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The idea in linguistics that the absence of an overt structural element 
can have real consequences — that nothing can be something — may 
perhaps forever and rightly be analytically suspect.  But it does have a 
long pedigree and a successful track record.  For instance, various null 
elements have been proposed in phonology, morphology, and 
grammar.  And, in addition to discrete null elements, there are 
broader types of structural distinctions involving the absence of overt 
structure.  Evidence continues to support the position that structural 
absence has a role to play in linguistic theory.  And linguistics is far 
from unique in this respect; absence plays roles in such other realms 
of human experience as physics, mathematics, sport, music, and 
anthropology. 
 Any misgivings in linguistics about the absence of substance 
have august precedent.  Albert Einstein’s discomfort with the idea in 
quantum mechanics that measurement of a particle in one place can 
have an effect on a particle in a completely different place was 
famously expressed in his phrase “spooky action at a distance.”  Yet 
experimental evidence has long since backed up the notion of such 
“entanglement” of particles.  Similarly in linguistics, decades of work 
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have supported the position that nothingness is a force to be reckoned 
with. 
 There is no need now, therefore, for a paper laying out a 
general theoretical consideration of nullity in linguistics, and certainly 
no need to justify the practical uses that have been made of various 
nulls.  This paper, instead, will trace a development from the very 
early days of the field to the most recent developments in Columbia 
School and variationist linguistics.  This is the path that leads to the 
work of Ricardo Otheguy and that stands to inform the work of 
linguists who will continue to benefit from his influence.  This path 
runs from the American Descriptivist null or zero element in 
phonological and morphological paradigms, through the empty 
categories of later formal syntax and — contemporaneously but not 
compatibly — the organization of Columbia School’s grammatical 
systems, extending then to more recent work that expands Columbia 
School theory and to Otheguy’s own constructive critique of variation-
ist linguistics.  In terms of forebears to Otheguy, this treatment will 
touch upon, among others, Saussure, Bloomfield, Harris, Chomsky, 
Diver, Labov, and García.  Throughout the paper, analogies will be 
made with other, nonlinguistic human behaviors, in keeping with the 
view that human language, far from being modular, is instead “entirely 
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consistent with the way any other form of everyday human activity is 
carried out” (Diver, 1995/2012, p. 485). 
 
 
1.  The null in mathematics 
 
While quantum mechanics represents human efforts to understand 
physical phenomena, the null — or empty, or zero — element has 
played an important role too in fields that deal with human mental 
concepts.  So mathematics, for instance, has its empty set.  Consider 
the three simple equations and the sets of solutions each has in real 
numbers in Diagram 1. 
 
Diagram 1.  Null in mathematics 
      I     II     III 
Equation: x2 = 9  2x = 0  x2 = -1 
Solutions: {-3, +3} {0}  { } 
Size of set: 2 solutions 1 solution 0 solutions 
 
Equation I has two solutions, -3 and +3; that is, the set of solutions to 
Equation I has two members.  Equation II has one solution, the real 
number 0; the set of solutions to Equation II has one member. 
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Equation III has no solutions on the real number line; the set of 
solutions to Equation III has no members.  Mathematics calls { } the 
empty set.  Another symbol for the same concept is Ø.  Of course, 
mathematics is not linguistcs, and empty sets in mathematical set 
theory do not relate to sets of real numbers in the same ways that null 
elements in linguistics relate to overt elements in linguistics.  Still, 
mathemtics does offer another realm of human experience in addition 
to linguistics where a full understanding requires the postulation of a 
kind of emptiness.  Besides, in “Ø,” mathematics furnishes a handy 
symbol for linguists to use. 
 
 
2.  The null in semiotics 
 
Conceptual uses of the empty structural element include not only the 
mathematical but also the semiotic.  Consider first baseball and then 
language. 
 In baseball, it is the job of the umpire to judge whether each 
pitch that comes towards the batter is a good pitch or a bad pitch.  
Those are the only two possibilities.  A good pitch is called a strike; a 
bad pitch is called a ball.  A strike, or a good pitch, is a pitch that the 
batter should reasonably try to hit.  If the batter does not swing at a 
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good pitch, the umpire calls a strike and thereby penalizes the batter’s 
team.  A ball, or a bad pitch, is a pitch that the batter should not be 
expected to try to hit.  If the batter does not swing at a bad pitch, the 
umpire calls a ball and thereby penalizes the pitcher’s team.  To 
convey to the assembled crowd of spectators his judgement of each 
pitch, the umpire employs visual signals—to use the semiotic term—
for strike and ball:  To signal “strike,” the umpire visibly moves one 
arm, typically extending it at an upward angle.  To signal “ball,” the 
umpire does nothing.  See Diagram 2.   
 
 Diagram 2.  Null in baseball 
 
 @@ Insert file Umpire here 
  
  “Strike!”   “Ball.” 
 
In the closed semiotic system that is shared by the umpire, the 
players, and the spectators, that absence of movement by the umpire 
is significant; it conveys a meaning.  Baseball uses a null element. 
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2.1  Linguistics 
 
Linguistic theory has made extensive use of nothingness.  This has 
been the case even though it has long been recognized that language-
users’ pragmatic interpretation in discourse goes “beyond what 
sentences actually say” (Li & Thompson, 1979, p. 312), even to the 
point that, according to Ono & Thompson (1997, p. 489), if inference 
in communication were properly taken into account, then the 
syntactic “notion of ‘zero’” that they have in mind “would play no 
role.”  That is, linguistic theory under-represents the messages for 
whose communication humans use language.  This view (that 
grammar falls short of accounting for communication) is essentially 
compatible with Columbia School’s distinction between signaled 
meaning and inferred message (Diver, 1974/2012, p. 31, 1975/2012, 
pp. 48-54). 
 Nevertheless, the null in linguistics has been heavily relied 
upon. 
 Typically, in lexicon, phonological distinctiveness is crucial for 
keeping lexical items apart.  So bear needs to be pronounced distinctly 
from beer, if miscommunication is not to ensue.  Nevertheless, 
homonymy — the absence of a phonological distinction — is 
commonplace in lexicon, as in “bear the burden,” “trap a bear,” and 
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“bare one’s soul” — plus “the undertaker needs another bier.”  As 
evidenced by such speech communities as the French and the 
Mandarin, the human capacity for dealing with homonymy in speech 
is vast.  Homonymy may well be the strongest evidence for what Diver 
(1975/2012, pp. 53-56) referred to as a “human factor” in language:  
the fact that human intelligence is what allows language to function as 
well as it does in spite of the semiotic imperfections built into its 
structure. 
 In orthography, a writer may use an alphabet to represent 
meaningful units such as words.  To that end, English orthography 
typically makes use of twenty-six letters, A-Z.  Omission of letters, 
however, may be indicated by an apostrophe, as in isn’t (is not) or 
fo’c’sle (forecastle).  The apostrophe, then, is in a sense sometimes an 
orthographic null element. 
 
2.1.1  Saussure to Bloomfield to Chomsky and beyond 
Linguistics has a long tradition of the use of the null element.  
Saussure (1878, interpreted in Diver, 1974/2012, pp. 27-30) 
proposed for historical Greek a zero alternation with /e/ and /o/ (e.g., 
leip- / loip- / lip-) to account for attested patterns of vowels in Indo-
European languages.  Bloomfield (1926), in his “Set of Postulates for 
the Science of Language,” decreed:  “Absence of sound may be a 
 8 
phonetic or formal alternant [§43]. . . .  Such an alternant is a zero 
element [§44].”  Bloomfield gave empirical justification:  “The 
postulation of zero elements is necessary for Sanskrit . . ., for Primitive 
Indo-European . . ., and probably economical for English.”  For the last, 
Bloomfield cited book “with affix zero, as opposed to book-s.”  Here 
Bloomfield was treating together “phonetic alternation,” involving 
phonemes, and “formal alternation,” involving  morphemes.  Zero as a 
phoneme was taken up by Hockett (1942, §7.8) and achieved a fairly 
secure place, as phoneme or allophone, in American Descriptive 
linguistics.  Zero as a morpheme was enshrined by Harris (1942, 
§2.1). 
 The null element in grammar — though certainly grammar is a 
term of uncertain denotation, depending on the grammarian — rests 
upon the postulation of a null element in morphology.  For instance, 
once the linguist, with Harris (1946), moves “From Morpheme to 
Utterance,” the postulation of a zero in morphology leads inexorably 
to the concept of a zero in syntax (§7.3).  Thus Ø enters into formal 
syntax essentially as a morpheme.  For instance, in Syntactic 
Structures (Chomsky, 1957, p. 39), Ø is an option alongside other 
verbal affixes denoted past, S, en, and ing in a rewriting rule.  Then, in 
Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, come the dummy element and the null 
feature (Chomsky, 1965, pp. 103, 155).  These last are purely formal 
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elements of syntax with no phonological or morphological content.  
For instance, one “dummy element” serves for “signifying” that the 
rule of the passive transformation of a sentence is obligatory, and one 
“null feature” specifies part of the syntactic environment for a 
selectional rule involving adjectives that can describe humans or not.  
The raison d’être of such constructs is to represent a syntactic 
property, something to do with the structure of sentences, not with 
the structure of morphemes.  Likewise, the principle of “recoverability 
of deletion” (Chomsky, 1965, pp. 179, 182) in transformational syntax 
leads naturally to the creation of some formalism — a trace — to 
preserve the element that is deleted.  For instance, the adjective clever 
would hypothetically have been deleted — leaving a trace — from its 
application to the noun Mary in the sentence These men are more 
clever than Mary.  A syntactic slot, furthermore, is free to be occupied 
by an empty category such as PRO in a subject slot:  It is unclear what 
PRO to do (Chomsky, 1982, p. 64). 
 Outside of the realm of formal syntax, too, the recognition of 
significant absence is longstanding, even if the theoretical basis for the 
recognition has remained largely unquestioned.  In both the variation-
ist and the grammaticalization frameworks — not that these are 
always separate — significant absence (e.g., null, zero, or null 
instantiation) is supported by some sort of structural paradigm, be it 
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communicative (e.g., rhetorical), semantic (e.g., conceptual), 
traditional (e.g., the paradigm of grammatical person), or still 
syntactic.  
 Taking a feature of discourse — quotation — into account, 
D’Arcy (2012), in a variationist, diachronic study of English, sees a 
“null form” as a “strategy” of introducing quotation, alongside such 
overt lexical material as say, think, go, and (forms of) be like, to which 
list D’Arcy appends “Other.”  If lexical items such as these — as 
opposed to grammatical elements — are members of an “open list” 
(Diver, 1990/2012, p. 69), then such a “null form,” rather than 
constituting a structurally defined element as above, really amounts 
to the absence of an overt form (see below) in a communicative 
rhetorical context that is researcher-defined. 
 As regards the diachronic dimension, Bickel, Witzlack-
Makarevich, Zakharko & Iemmolo (2015) assume the “structure of 
agreement paradigms” to frame their cross-linguistic investigation 
testing a diachronic universal statistical principle involving the 
development, through grammaticalization, of “zero forms in the third 
rather than in the first and second person” (p. 30).  Here, obviously, 
the paradigm of grammatical person provides the frame in which a 
zero form can be posited or assumed. 
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 Bybee (1994), treating “The Grammaticization of Zero,” 
proposes that, through usage, something conceptual that is 
identifiable only in the “universal conceptual space surrounding the 
communicative context of language use” (p. 251), but not in the 
linguistic system itself, can develop into a linguistic element that has 
no phonetic substance but “true semantic content that is equivalent in 
many ways to” other linguistic elements (p. 242).i  Here, not universal 
syntactic structure but “universal conceptual space” is guiding the 
postulation of zero.   
 In a similar vein, but adding a variationist approach too, Torres 
Cacoullos & Walker (2009) identify “overt indication of temporal 
distance” — cf. no overt indication — as a conditioning factor in 
“expression of future time in English.”  Zero remains even here a 
creature of hypothetical structure, semantic even if not morphological 
or syntactic. 
 In variationist linguistics, some version of null is much studied, 
but typically it is assumed as the realization of a syntactic slot, not 
fundamentally proposed or questioned as a theoretical entity.  For 
instance, Schwenter (2006), assuming, as did Chomsky, the syntactic 
framework of sentence structure, treats “null direct object” as an 
“observation” that is empirically “VARIABLE” in Spanish.ii  Tippets 
(2011) likewise assumes a syntactic framework within which to 
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identify direct objects in Spanish.  Within the “envelope of variation” 
of verbs that occur with “a-marked” direct objects, Tippets compares 
these tokens with “un-marked or a-less tokens” (excluding other uses 
of a ‘to’).iii   
 Subject of the sentence, too, counts as a syntactic slot.  Within 
variationist linguistics,  the problem of “the variable absence and 
presence of subject personal pronouns in Spanish” — in the careful 
words of Ricardo Otheguy (2015, emphasis added jd) — has an 
extensive literature.  It is an apparently uncontroversial statement 
that “In Spanish, as with other so-called pro-drop languages, subject 
personal pronouns (SPPs) are often omitted . . . without changing the 
basic meaning of the utterance” (Carvalho, Orozco, & Shin, 2015, p. 
xiii).   Leaving aside other theoretical obstacles (or “boulders,” to use 
Otheguy’s term), the view that a subject personal pronoun is 
“omitted” can ultimately be traced back, perhaps, all the way to the 
pioneering variationist study of the “deletion” of copula in English by 
Labov (1969).  Though much that is practical — involving, say, 
bilingualism, contact, and language acquisition — has been learned 
through quantitative studies of the phenomenon (as seen in papers in 
Carvalho, Orozco, & Shin, 2015), few are those scholars who have 
questioned, as Otheguy has, whether the absence — or omission or 
deletion — of a form (such as él ‘he’) is the same thing, theoretically 
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speaking, as the presence of a null form ().iv  As Otheguy points out, 
the distinction becomes crucial when, for instance, a researcher is 
concerned, on the one hand, with syntactic factors such as tense and, 
on the other, with extra-sentential discourse factors such as 
continuity of reference (or “switch reference”). 
 The theme in this intellectual history is the power of 
postulated structure to compel the postulation of null elements to 
prop that structure up.  So if it is postulated that there exist 
meaningful forms (morphemes) made up of phonological elements 
(phonemes), then if these entities sometimes turn up (in alternation 
or in historical development) without those phonological elements, a 
null alternate of the physically absent sound will serve the purpose of 
preserving the postulated morphological structure.  And if it is 
postulated that there exist sentences arranged in rule-governed 
patterns, then if these sentences sometimes turn up without those 
patterns (e.g., an infinitive clause without an overt subject), an empty 
category will serve the purpose of preserving the postulated sentence 
structure.  Or if, instead of syntax, semantics is assumed to be 
universal, then alternation between the overt and the covert can still 
be deemed to have been “observed.”  When such statements are made, 
theory—explicit or not—is driving analysis. 
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2.1.2.  William Diver and the Columbia School 
Not to say that analysis ever should or could be purely bottom-up or 
ad-hoc.  Even the iconoclast William Diver (1993/2012, 1995/2012) 
— who, like Saussure before him, renounced the nomenclaturism of 
syntax (Otheguy, 2002) in developing what we now know as Columbia 
School linguistics and who insisted that “theory be guided by analysis, 
rather than the other way around” (1995/2012, p. 445) —  Even Diver 
measured analytical success by the goodness of fit of his hypotheses 
to the data he had chosen, and he explicitly recognized the theoretical 
orientations that held the hypotheses together plausibly and 
coherently.  That is, some overarching consideration always justifies 
the postulation of a null element.  That is true both in what precedes 
and in what follows. 
 Diver’s thought, while certainly influenced by his predecessors, 
is distinct from the paradigms of formal linguistics, grammaticaliza-
tion, and variationist linguistics.v 
 
2.1.2.1.  Diver and null.  Diver adopted the American Descriptivist 
construct of null.  He discussed it in Diver (1990/2012) and 
incorporated it right into his grammar, where it was a signal of a 
meaning (cf. Saussure’s signifiant and signifié), for instance the 
meaning ONE in the English system of Number, as in cat-Ø as opposed 
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to cat-s, with –s being the signal of the opposing meaning OTHER THAN 
ONE.  Thus, Diver continued the practice of positing a null element to 
support the postulation of structure, in this case by using null to 
complete the exhaustive categorization of the semantic substance of 
Number. 
 This is not to say that it is always easy to decide whether or not 
to posit a zero signal, but in principle the decision is guided by 
oppositional structure, as long recognized (e.g., García & Putte, 1989).  
Contini-Morava (2006) wrestles with the question of “The Difference 
Between Zero and Nothing” in the context of a Swahili problem.  
Certain Swahili noun classes, unlike most of the eleven or so noun 
classes in that language, lack any identifying overt prefix in certain 
morphophonemic contexts.  Only one of these noun classes, according 
to Contini-Morava, should be analyzed as having a zero prefix; the 
others “simply lack a prefix.”  This is an analytical decision, not a 
given.  In Contini-Morava’s words (p. 221):  “a zero, or significant 
absence, can be most easily recognized (and therefore can reliably 
convey its meaning [in Diver’s sense of that term]) within a closed set 
of oppositions in which all other alternatives are overt marks of some 
kind.” 
 But the present paper is not a disquisition on just null; it is 
instead, one might say, a broader Much Ado About Nothing.  This 
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paper is an overview of the ways in which linguistic structure can be 
analytically relevant even when there is no overt sign of it at a certain 
point in discourse.  Among those ways, zero, or the null element, is 
just one; there are other ways. 
 
2.1.2.2.  Diver and homonymy in grammar.  Another way for linguistic 
structure to be absent but relevant, seen already here in lexicon, is 
homonymy, in which a posited structural distinction is not 
maintained.  Diver had homonymy in grammar too.  This in itself is 
not unusual when one thinks of the homonymy of the English plural 
noun –s mentioned just above, as in the cat-s, and the singular verb –s, 
as in It meows.  These hypotheses regarding the homonymy of -s in 
English are developed in Reid (1991) and further in Reid (2011). 
 Nor is such homonymy unusual in another of Diver’s languages 
of interest, Latin.  There, for instance, the suffix of the nominative 
plural of the first declension is identical to the suffix of the dative 
singular of that declension, so agricolae could be ‘farmer-nom-pl’ or 
‘farmer-dat-sg.’  (In other declensions, the nominative plural and the 
dative singular are phonologically distinct.)  For Diver (in Diver & 
Davis, 2012, pp. 218-219), those cases were signals of meanings in a 
grammatical system he called Degree of Control.  Diagram 3 shows the 
system in an interlock with the system of Number and illustrated with 
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a lexical item of the first declension (with length indicated by colon), 
with the two instances of the homonymous agricolae highlighted in 
italic type: 
 
 Diagram 3.  Diver’s system of Degree of Control in Latin 
 (simplified) 
  meanings signals illustration (ONE / OTHER) 
  MOST  nominative agricola  /  agricolae 
  MORE  ablative agricola:  / agricoli:s 
  LESS  dative  agricolae / agricoli:s  
  LEAST  accusative agricolam / agricola:s 
 
It is not too difficult to imagine, in light of Diver’s “human factor” 
(Diver, 1975/2012, pp. 53-56 et passim) how intelligent human beings 
manage to distinguish one agricolae from the other:  In a given 
context, it will often be true that one knows whether one is dealing 
with one farmer or more, or whether one is dealing with a man 
(nominative) who, say, is selling corn, or with someone lower down on 
the scale of responsibility, such as a man (dative) who is sold corn.  
This must pretty much be the way modern Spanish speakers decide 
whether an instance of, say, canto is ‘song’ or ‘I sing’:  by an intelligent 
use of context. 
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 The postulation of homonymy in cases such as agricolae is 
fairly straightforward.  A more interesting positing of homonymy in 
Diver’s grammar is represented by agricoli:s in Diagram 3.  Diver 
would have two signals agricoli:s.  These are signals of the two distinct 
meanings MORE and LESS Degrees of Control “exercised by a participant 
over some activity, usually that indicated by the verb” (p. 215).  But 
here, the two putative signals are adjacent on the scale.  Moreover, the 
ablative plural and the dative plural are always—without 
exception!—phonologically identical.  One might well wonder how 
language-users manage to distinguish the two signals and thus the 
two meanings.  Obviously, it was the structure of the Control-Number 
interlock that guided Diver’s decision to posit two signals here.  Diver 
(1995/2012, p. 493) justified the decision regarding Latin ablative 
and dative plural the same way he did “the loss of a singular-plural 
distinction [in modern English you] which was maintained elsewhere 
in the system”:  “the distinction made, precisely, in the system as a 
whole [i.e., I/we; me/us; he, she, it / they; him, her, it / them] is used as 
a reference point for setting up the possibilities from among which to 
choose where the signalling is imprecise [i.e., you].” 
 Evidently, in the phrase “as a reference point for setting up the 
possibilities,” Diver was not referring (just) to the analyst but to the 
language-user: 
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For the reader of the Latin text, the imprecise plural case form 
[e.g., agricoli:s] provides only the information that the word is 
to be regarded as not nominative, not accusative, not genitive, 
and what is left in doubt is only the distinction between dative 
and ablative.  The reader, knowing [thanks to the singular, 
presumably; jd] the ways in which the dative and the ablative 
are used, can then decide which of the two is the more 
appropriate to infer.  The need for the application of an 
intelligent appraisal is evident.  (Diver, 1995/2012, p. 493) 
 
Regardless of one’s confidence in Diver’s speculation about the 
psychological processes of the (proficient) reader of Latin, it is clear 
that the analyst, in setting up two signals for ablative plural and dative 
plural, is being guided by structure that is posited elsewhere and 
deemed to be relevant. 
 The thinking brings to mind the conception of linguistic 
structure traceable to Saussure (if through Meillet):  a system — un 
tout en soi (Saussure, 1916/1972, p. 25) — in which tout se tient ‘the 
whole thing hangs together.’ One part of the grammar is related to 
every other part of the grammar. 
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2.1.2.3.  Diver’s residual member.  That interrelatedness of grammatical 
elements is particularly striking in what Diver (1978/2012, p. 125 et 
passim) called the residual member of a grammatical system, one 
whose “semantic substance is defined entirely by its opposition to the 
other members.”  A somewhat trivial illustration of a residual 
member, seen already, is the English signal –s of the meaning OTHER 
THAN ONE in the system of Number (e.g., cat-s).  A perhaps better 
illustration that the residual member means essentially NONE OF THE 
ABOVE would be Diver’s (1978/2012, p. 122) hypothesis for the 
meaning of the Greek genitive case in his system of Relation to a Place, 
Diagram 4: 
 
 Diagram 4:  Diver’s system of Relation to a Place in Greek 
 meanings      signals 
 AT A SPECIFIED PLACE     dative 
 WELL-ORDERED WITH RESPECT TO A SPECIFIED PLACE accusative 
 OTHER PLACE RELATIONS    genitive 
 
Basically, the Greek dative, says Diver, is used for a point-like location, 
the accusative for neat relations such as lines and circles, and the 
genitive for messier place relations such as the missing of a target or 
the meandering of a vine around a cave.  The meaning of the genitive, 
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then, is essentially NOT one of the other meanings of the system.  In the 
Greek Place system, the genitive is a null kind of thing, in a way:  an 
absence of something more structurally well-defined. 
 
2.1.2.4.  Diver’s opposition of inclusion.  Another variation on these 
system-internal relations is represented by Diver’s opposition of 
inclusion.  To understand this kind of structural relationship, it is 
necessary first to understand those seen, for instance, in Diagrams 3 
and 4 as oppositions of exclusion:  each meaning of the system excludes 
all the other members of the system.  Such oppositions of exclusion, 
where one value excludes all the other values, are the norm in Diver.  
Oppositions of inclusion are far less common.  One is represented by 
the system of Number in Greek (Diver, 1987/2012).  To make the 
point, Diagram 5 contrasts the Number system of Greek — with its 
opposition of inclusion — with those of Latin and Sanskrit — which 
have only the more routine oppositions of exclusion. 
 
 Diagram 5.  Three systems of Number 
 Latin  Sanskrit   Greek 
 ONE  ONE   ONE 
   TWO    TWO 
 OTHER  OTHER   OTHER 
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Latin has the familiar set-up:  a signal (the singular) for the meaning 
ONE and a signal (the plural) for everything else.  That is like English or 
Spanish.  Sanskrit has something a bit more unusual but still just 
straightforward oppositions of exclusion:  a signal (the singular) for 
the meaning ONE, a signal (the dual) for the meaning TWO, and a signal 
(the “plural”) for everything else, such as three, four, or seventy.  But 
Greek has an opposition of inclusion.  Greek has a dedicated signal 
(the singular) for the meaning ONE and a dedicated signal (the dual) 
for the meaning TWO, but its signal for numbers such as three, four, 
and seventy (its “plural”), can be used too when there are only two of 
something.  The Greek meaning OTHER includes the meaning TWO.  
(This is indicated by the curly bracket.)  Diver was fascinated by how 
the Greek writer, Homer, employed this Number system in accordance 
with an apparent interest in being precise or not, using the included 
signal of the meaning TWO for things that were of special interest to 
him and the including member, the meaning OTHER, for things that 
were of less interest to him.  The point for us, however, is merely that, 
here again, an element of structure—a precise Number meaning—can 
be dispensed with.  Put another way, a certain element of linguistic 
structure—the meaning TWO—remains relevant even when it is not 
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signaled, even when the poet opts out of signaling that precise 
number. 
 All the structural relations seen so far might be called 
oppositions of value.  In them, a given semantic substance — e.g., 
Number or Relation to a Place — is exhaustively divided up, by 
signals, into relative values.  One value is defined by its opposition to 
the others, that is, by being not another value in the same semantic 
substance.  We have seen four types of hypotheses in Diver where an 
element of structure may, at a certain point in the text, be relevantly 
not present:  the null signal, homonymy, the residual member in a 
system, and the including member in a system. 
 
2.1.3.  The opposition of substance 
Another type of structural relation illustrates too, in its own way, the 
relevance of an absence of structure at a certain point in the text.  This 
is the opposition of substance.  As defined by Davis (1992, p. 287, 
summarized in Davis, 1995), an opposition of substance is “a 
relationship in which two signals have certain meanings in common 
but differ in that one signal entirely lacks meanings from some 
semantic substance to which the other signal belongs.”vi  This 
structural relation was defined in order to account for the distribution 
in texts of two pronouns in modern literary Italian, egli and lui, both 
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often glossed ‘he.’  The meanings that egli and lui have in common — 
and so establish a basis upon which the two pronouns can be related 
— are:  Number ONE, Sex MALE, Referent OTHER THAN SPEAKER OR HEARER 
(i.e., third person), and Attention LOW (as opposed to more highly 
demonstrative forms).  Where they differ — their opposition of 
substance — is in that egli, but not lui, also signals a meaning from an 
additional substance:  the meaning CENTRAL in a system of Focus on 
participants in events.  Essentially, egli is restricted to being the 
subject (not the oblique) of a particular verb, while lui is much more 
of a free-floater.  Consequently, the relevance of egli is tied to a 
particular event in the narrative, while lui may conceptually relate to 
something in addition to — or even instead of — an event in the 
narrative.  For instance, lui may suggest a contrast between one man 
(lui) doing one thing and another man mentioned elsewhere in the 
context.  Such a token of lui would be relevant both to its own verb 
and to some noun somewhere else in the context. 
 As can be imagined, the contrast between egli and lui is subtle 
and requires careful validation.  Other oppositions of substance, 
however, are more readily obvious (given knowledge of the 
morphology).  Davis (2002) analyzes the three Italian third-person 
disjunctive pronouns ess+ (where ‘+’ indicates a slot for a gender and 
number suffix –a, -o, -e, -i), loro, and sé in terms of oppositions of 
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substance.  So essi ‘they / them’ is explicitly plural in number and 
masculine in gender.  Loro ‘they / them / each other’ is explicitly 
plural in number but indifferent to grammatical gender.  And sé 
‘themselves / himself / herself / itself’ is indifferent to both number 
and gender.  The three forms thus illustrate a one-step-at-a-time 
reduction in the relative semantic weights that they bear.  Ess+ 
provides the most information:  person, number, and gender.  Loro 
provides just person and number.  And sé signals only person.  The 
analysis shows how these oppositions of substance account for the 
observed distributions of the three forms in texts, including examples 
traditionally classed, respectively, as demonstrative, reciprocal, and 
reflexive:  ‘they talk in the midst of them ( fra essi)’; ‘they talk among 
themselves ( fra loro)’; ‘they talk to themselves ( fra sé).’  The 
distribution of loro is accounted for by a language-user’s opting out of 
the substance that corresponds to grammatical gender.  The 
distribution of sé is accounted for by an opting out of substances 
having to do with number and grammatical gender.  The relevance of 
that analysis to the present thesis is, again, that the systematic 
absence of a certain element of structure can be relevant in accounting 
for the observed presence of a form at a certain point in a text. 
 The idea of the opposition of substance is carried out more 
fully in Davis (2017b).vii  There, the Italian clitic si, traditionally 
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classed as the impersonal and reflexive pronoun of the third person 
(‘one,’ ‘himself / herself / itself / themselves’), is analyzed in terms of 
oppositions of substance.  Most of the other clitics (datives gli/le/loro, 
accusatives lo/la/li/le, plus the freestanding egli) signal meanings 
from systems of Number, grammatical gender or Sex, and a system 
called Degree of Control (traditionally, case), which (as above, for 
Diver) has to do with a participant’s level of responsibility for an 
event.  Si, by contrast, represents an opting out of all of those 
substances.  The presence of si at a certain point in the text is a result 
of a writer’s avoidance of those semantic substances.  Sometimes they 
are irrelevant, sometimes they are superfluous, and sometimes they 
are too categorical and so get “neutralized” by si.  Si signals very little:  
just that some third person is participating somehow in an event.  Just 
who and just how, is left to inference.  Crucial to the thesis here:  The 
distribution of si can be accounted for only by an analytical appeal to 
those very semantic substances in the network of systems of which si 
is a part, which are not signaled by si.  Si is present at a point in a text 
because of what si is not.  Si is a mere specter of a pronoun, hardly a 
substantial pronoun at all—if one believes in pronouns. 
 The oppositions of substance that are posited for si account not 
only for individual tokens of si but also for statistical patterns across 
large stretches of text.  For instance, in an authentic text, a chapter 
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about people “Becoming Part of the Roman World” contains more 
tokens of signals of Degree of Control relative to si, while a chapter 
about “Italic Alphabets and Dialects” contains fewer tokens of signals 
of Degree of Control relative to si.viii  This observed difference can be 
attributed to the human factor:  People are typically held, by language-
users, to bear considerable responsibility for events, while alphabets 
and dialects have no will of their own.  See Table 1. 
 
Table 1.  Si- and the Neutralization of Control* 
 
        Ch. VI            Ch. XI 
 
   ‘Italic Alphabets   ‘Becoming Part of  
and Dialects’    the Roman World’ 
si (no Control meaning)  122    196 
l+ (a Control meaning)      9      35 
      Ratio  14:1     Ratio    6:1 
OR > 2.4 
*Source of data:  Giacomo Devoto.  1951.  Gli antichi italici.  2nd 
edition.  Firenze:  Vallecchi. 
 
In this text, the odds of observing si, as opposed to l+, in a chapter (VI) 
devoted to alphabets and dialects is over twice as high as the odds of 
observing si in a chapter (XI) devoted to people.  Thus, an element of 
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linguistic structure that is present here and absent there in a text has 
very real, measurable effects on the structure of discourse.  Or, at 
least, the opposition of substance provides an account of such 
correlations in discourse. 
 The opposition of substance is one more development in a 
series of linguistic treatments that point to the relevance of the 
insubstantial in observable phenomena. 
 
 
3.  Unsignaled structure in music 
 
Much as the relevance of the opposition of substance finds support in 
language, so too the relevance of unsignaled structure finds support in 
semiotics outside of language:  in music.  This extra-linguistic support 
is relevant if, as indicated in the introduction to this paper, the facts of 
linguistic structure resemble importantly, through and through, 
aspects of other types of human behavior. 
 Consider modern western musical notation.  Analogize a 
linguistic element (e.g., si) to a certain triad of notes (e.g., GBD) in a 
musical score; analogize a phrase in a piece of discourse to a musical 
phrase; and analogize a language-user’s grammar (a system of 
systems) to a whole musical composition.  The eighteenth-to-
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nineteenth-century convention in music was to indicate the key 
signature of an entire composition just once, at the very beginning of 
the piece; it is assumed then that that key signature prevails until it is 
explicitly changed.ix  As a result, accidentals — sharps and flats — do 
not need to be indicated for each note of the perhaps several pages of 
a western classical or romantic musical composition, but only once.  
Wherever the accidentals are not explicitly indicated, they are, 
actually, missing structures.  In terms of performance, this principle of 
organization entails that a pianist’s fingers, for example, will alight on 
a black or a white key in response to structure that is not signaled at 
that point in the musical text, perhaps not even on that page of text.  
For instance, consider the triad in Diagram 6: 
 
 Diagram 6.  Opposition of substance in musical notation 
 
 @@ Insert file Gchord here 
 
Three notes — making one chord — are indicated, but exactly what 
those three notes are depends on the key signature that was 
established at the very beginning of the composition.  There are six 
different combinations of actual notes potentially played — the 
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observations that a viewer-listener would make — depending on the 
overall key of the composition.  See Table 2: 
 
Table 2.  Musical triads instantiating multiple compositional keys 
 notes played   key of the composition 
• G – B – D C maj., a min., G maj., e min., D maj., b min. 
• G#-B – D A maj., f# min. 
• G#-B – D# E maj., c# min., B maj., g# min., F# maj., d# min. 
• G – Bb- D F maj., d min., Bb maj., g min., Eb maj., c min. 
• G - Bb- Db Ab maj., f min. 
• Gb- Bb- Db Db maj., bb min., Gb maj., eb min. 
 
For the benefit of those who know only that a piano has black keys 
and white keys:  The number of those colors played might be 0, 1, 2, or 
3, depending.  Now of course a proficient pianist playing a Chopin 
étude typically will not pause to calculate all this, but the performance 
— the observable distribution of the movement of the fingers, to put it 
crudely — gives evidence of his or her implicit knowledge of the 
semiotic system. 
 Human beings are capable of operating systematically even 
when relevant structure is not explicitly signaled. 
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4.  When there’s no there there 
 
In all the linguistic situations surveyed thus far, a posited structure 
provides a framework within which to posit a theoretically significant 
absence:  homonymy, the null morpheme, the residual member or the 
including member in an opposition of value, and the opposition of 
substance.  For Chomsky and his followers, that framework is 
sentence structure; for Diver and his followers, that framework is a 
grammatical system (e.g., Number, Degree of Control, Focus, Relation 
to a Place) and the interlocks into which that system enters with other 
grammatical systems.  This structural framework serves as a kind of 
analytical control over what gets posited; no linguist would posit a 
million zeroes all over the place. 
 That granted, however, it might be worth asking:  Can anything 
interesting be said about situations when a structural element is 
present versus when it is absent, when it is simply not there, when 
nothing is simply nothing?  This is the question that Contini-Morava 
(2006) skirts but rightly avoids.  Her chosen problem is, How can we 
tell a significant null from just nothing?  Her chosen problem is not, 
What can we say when there is simply nothing?  To address that 
question would require that we sacrifice the tight analytical control of 
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a posited structural framework.  The fear of that analytical precipice 
can be expressed with the truism that, throughout a body of discourse, 
there is an infinite number of absences of whatever structural element 
one might choose to study (for instance, the absence of whom in this 
paper). 
 Still, it might be possible to gain some understanding of what is 
accomplished by interjecting a structural element at a certain point in 
discourse as opposed to leaving it out at that point altogether.  To 
make the task as manageable as possible, we would need to hold 
constant some element in the context.  Then we could at least get a 
sense of what effect is achieved by a language-user’s introducing our 
hypothesized semantic substance versus not introducing it at that 
point in the discourse.x 
 Again, an extra-linguistic analogy is not hard to identify.  For 
instance, a serious anthropologist might wish to study presence 
versus absence of open umbrella.  Clearly, the anthropologist would 
want to hold certain variables constant; for instance, there might be 
no reason to study open umbrellas (or their absence) in the hands of 
persons lying in bed, nor open umbrellas carried (or not) by dogs, nor 
open umbrellas on cloudless days, nor open umbrellas on Antarctica.  
One could hold variables constant by limiting the study to, say, human 
pedestrians during rainfall.  One could limit the geographical range of 
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the study to, say, Northampton County, North Carolina; the borough of 
Manhattan, New York; and the city of Venice, Italy.  Conducting such a 
study might reveal genuinely interesting facts about issues such as:  
sartorial fashion across generations, gender stereotypes across 
cultures, the attitudes towards rain among participants in agricultural 
versus urban cultures, and the design of thoroughfares across 
jurisdictions.xi 
 It is indeed feasible to study the presence versus the absence of 
a thing. 
 To conduct that as a study in Columbia School linguistics, one 
would have to ask:  Under what circumstances is a given semantic 
substance not signaled at all? 
 
4.1. Absence studied from a Columbia School linguistic perspective 
 
Consider the distribution in modern literary Italian of vi and ci, 
adverbial clitics to the verb, both typically glossed ‘there’ and 
sometimes incorrectly viewed as “fully synonymous” (Russi, 2008, p. 
57).  Based on a survey of their distribution relative to each other, one 
might hypothesize that they are signals with relative values in a 
system of Restrictedness of Space, with vi signaling the meaning 
RESTRICTED and ci signaling the meaning UNRESTRICTED (Davis, 2017a).  
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Such a survey would include examples that are locative in a 
straightforward way, such as vi si annida ‘is hiding out there (in 
Rome)’ versus non ci torno ‘I’m not going back there (abroad)’ (Silone, 
Pane e vino).  But the survey would also include examples that the 
tradition classifies as existential, where the communicative effect is, 
putatively, merely to assert existence, as in Examples (1) (Rigoni 
Stern) and (2) (Calvino), below. 
 
 (1) vi        sono due pecore e      un maiale 
  there are    two sheep   and a    pig 
  ‘there are two sheep and a pig’ 
 
 (2) C’        era  una farfalla morta 
  there was a      dead     butterfly 
  ‘There was a dead butterfly’ 
 
Examination of the actual contexts of those examples reveals that, in 
(1), the sheep and the pig are conveniently confined in a stall where 
they can easily be slaughtered by hungry soldiers far from home, and 
that, in (2), the dead butterfly is found on the threshold of a house, 
one of several signs left here and there around the countryside by an 
evil viscount as omens of his ill intent towards his people.  Thus the 
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precise space in which the sheep and pig exist is relevant:  vi = 
RESTRICTED, while the precise space where the dead butterfly happens 
to be found is happenstance:  ci = UNRESTRICTED.  What the grammar of 
Italian needs to say, then, is not merely that certain examples are 
existential, but that sometimes the existence of something is asserted 
in a RESTRICTED Space and sometimes the existence of something is 
asserted in an UNRESTRICTED Space. 
 This understanding lays the groundwork for a survey of 
examples asserting the existence of something, some with vi or ci, and 
some with neither; that is, some signaling Restrictedness of Space, and 
some not:  some examples with a grammatical something, and some 
examples with grammatically nothing, some with presence and some 
with absence.  To make the survey manageable, one could limit it to 
examples with forms of the copula.  Among such examples, one would 
find example (3) (Silone): 
 
 (3) sulla    groppa dell’    asino     è  allungato 
       on-the rump   of-the donkey is stretched-out 
       ‘on the donkey’s rump is stretched out 
  il     cadavere d’un lupo 
  the body         of a   wolf 
  the body of a wolf’ 
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Examination of the context reveals that, in (3), a dead wolf is being 
displayed to a gaggle of villagers.  One of them has shot the wolf and 
has brought it to show to them, in order to warn them of the existence 
of danger in the region.  The point here is indeed simply that the wolf 
exists; there is no communicative need to restrict to a greater (vi) or 
lesser (ci) degree the space in which the wolf exists.  This example, 
therefore, contains no signal of Restrictedness of Space.  In the words 
of Gertrude Stein, “There is no there there.” 
 If we in linguistics ever manage to develop a good under-
standing of structural absence — homonymy, the null morpheme, the 
residual member or the including member in an opposition of value, 
the opposition of substance — then we will be in a better position to 
understand the absence of structure.  That is, understanding when 
nothing is something would help us to understand when nothing is 
simply nothing. 
 
4.2.  Absence studied in variationist linguistics 
 
An essentially comparable approach is taken by Otheguy & Zentella 
(2012) in their full-length study of the presence versus the absence of 
subject pronouns in Spanish in New York City.  Variationist linguistics 
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concerns primarily the differences in output among individuals and 
groups of individuals.  Now different individuals may have different 
mental grammars, especially if they are identified with different social 
groups (such as countries of origin).  Then, the question of presence 
versus absence of an element is worth asking only if both individuals 
possess the element in question and also exhibit the possibility of its 
absence.  For instance, both a Spanish speaker from Mexico and a 
Spanish speaker from Cuba might exhibit both Él come and Come ‘He 
eats,’ and a variationist might well study how the two speakers 
compare in terms of presence versus absence of él.  The variationist 
might investigate whether, in general, speakers from Mexico and 
speakers from Cuba differ in regard to presence versus absence of él, 
and if so then how so.  By contrast, it would hardly be worthwhile to 
study the presence versus the absence of the partitive clitic ne in the 
output of an Italian speaker from Italy compared to that of a Spanish 
speaker from Cuba; only the former would exhibit this ne at all.   
 To make their work analytically feasible — that is, so that they 
can manageably compare presence and absence of pronoun — what 
Otheguy & Zentella (2012, p. 48) hold constant — the way they define 
their “envelope of variation” — is the presence of a bare finite verb 
with an “ascertainable” animate subject.xii  If they did not do this, they 
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could claim that there are absences of overt pronoun all over the 
place. 
 It is worth considering why the problem of Él come and Come 
in the output of the Spanish speaker from Mexico and the Spanish 
speaker from Cuba is a problem of presence versus absence rather 
than a problem of él versus null.  While there are certainly empirical 
reasons related to their study for this decision, Otheguy & Zentella 
(2012, p. 9) give a theoretical rationale as well:  “The notion of a null 
pronoun reflects a conceptualization that is integral” in one’s 
theoretical framework.  “The postulation of nulls . . . is required by 
certain analytical claims that would otherwise be difficult to support” 
(cf. supra).xiii  This is the question of whether we have to do across the 
board — in both presence and absence — with structure or not.  In 
the review of linguistics traced so far in this paper, a phonetic null was 
posited by Harris, by Chomsky, and by Diver as a structural element in 
its own right, the occupier of a slot in a morphological paradigm, in a 
sentence, or in a grammatical system comprised of meaningful signals.  
The opposition of substance too has to do essentially with structure:  
the systematic opposition between an element that bears a meaning 
from some semantic structure (e.g., Italian l+ above, bearing a 
meaning of Degree of Control) and another element that does not (si).  
By contrast, at this point in this paper, the question is, instead, how to 
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treat the overt presence of a structural element versus the mere 
absence of that element, when the absence of that element is not itself 
a structural element.  There’s simply nothing there, much as when one 
compares an utterance like This is a really muggy night versus This is a 
muggy night.  So, it might be argued, the theoretical reason why 
Otheguy & Zentella (2012) treat utterances such as Come as the 
absence of él rather than as the presence of a null subject is because 
they are analyzing not sentence structure but attested speech.  
Without the assumption of the framework of sentence structure, the 
utterance Come is just the utterance Come, and it contains no él.xiv 
 Adopting this positon of presence versus absence, Otheguy & 
Zentella (2012) do discover interesting facts about Spanish as spoken 
in New York by members of various social groups.  The facts of 
variation result from differential motivations by the members of the 
groups to insert into discourse the functional content that a certain 
pronoun (e.g., él) contributes.  That insight is possible only if the 
question is framed in terms of presence versus absence.  If “null 
subject” had its own value — either different from or the same as 
“overt subject” — then that value — a positive thing — would be 
competing, as it were, with the value of “overt subject,” much as the 
value of, say él ‘he’ competes with the value of ella ‘she’ or with the 
value of ellos ‘they.’ 
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 In linguistics, absence is not necessarily the same thing as null.  
(As, in mathematics, empty set is not the same thing as the real 
number zero.) 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
In linguistics, it can be worthwhile to truck in nothingness.  That has 
been shown to be true in structural linguistics, in formal linguistics, in 
Columbia School linguistics, and in variationist linguistics and in 
grammaticalization.  Moreover, as Diver (1995/2012, pp. 446-447) 
would have it, language is in some respects like other aspects of 
intelligent human behavior.  So nothingness, if it is important outside 
linguistics (in mathematics, in sport, and so forth), may be important 
in linguistics too. 
 It is a well-known trait of human beings to seek out pattern 
and even to impute significance where there is none:  seeing crabs and 
bulls in the constellations, finding good luck in a four-leaf clover, or 
believing in a divine promise on account of a rainbow.  This general 
trait is no doubt an extra-linguistic manifestation of Diver’s “human 
factor” in linguistics.  In a finite semiotic system such as grammar, 
where all the parts of the system interrelate, it is human nature to 
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behave in ways that are consistent with that system, even when overt 
signaling of elements of the system is abandoned.  The semantic side 
of language does not cease to exist when the phonetic side falls silent.  
If this is indeed the way human beings behave when we speak and 
write, then it will be unavoidable for the linguist sometimes to 
formulate hypotheses of such insubstantial realities as null signals, 
homonyms, residual meanings, oppositions of inclusion, oppositions 
of substance, and indeed to reckon with absence itself. 
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Notes 
 
                                                        
i Already García & Putte (1989) had proposed frequency of usage as 
the mechanism that drives the diachronic development of an 
opposition between a nothing and a something. 
ii See Otheguy (2002) for a critique of the commonplace view in 
linguistics that syntactic categories constitute observations. 
iii On Spanish a with direct objects, see also García & Putte (1989). 
iv García & Putte (1989), in proposing a mechanism for the diachronic 
development of zero, had at least implicitly distinguished between 
absence (or “nothing”) and zero as a signifié. 
v Huffman (2001) and Huffman (2012) offer good, accessible 
introductions to Diver’s thought. See Davis (2004) for one take on 
Diver’s debt to Ferdinand de Saussure. 
vi García (1983) had accounted for the distribution of the Spanish 
disjunctive pronouns in a way that looked forward to the opposition 
 49 
                                                                                                                                          
of substance, though she did not use the term and she insisted, unlike 
Davis (1992), that the forms in question had no meaning in common. 
vii For another treatment of a modern reflex of Classical Latin sē in 
terms of an opposition of substance, see Gorup (2006) on Serbo-Croatian 
se.  For earlier analyses, not posting an opposition of substance, see 
García 1975, Diver 1986/2012, and Diver 1992/2012. 
viii This result is reported too in Davis (2016) and in Davis (2017b). 
ix This is where the analogy, like all analogies, is less than perfect.  In 
music, there is one conventionalized place to indicate key structure, 
while in discourse, there is no particular conventionalized place to 
indicate grammatical structure.  Musical key structure is typically 
made explicit by the composer at the beginning of the piece; 
grammatical structure is typically made explicit only by the linguist, 
not by the language-user — though language-users do occasionally 
speak somewhat explicitly about their grammatical structure:  “OK, 
I’m gonna speak English now, not Spanish” or “I’ve probably never 
heard egli in Italian speech, only lui.”  Anyway, much as an attested 
segment of a piece of music may lack any indication of still-relevant 
key signature, so an attested segment of discourse (e.g., a stretch with 
Italian si) may lack any indication of the still-relevant grammatical 
system (e.g., Degree of Control) being opted out of. 
x See also Tippets (2011).  An enlightening treatment that takes a 
different analytical approach is the examination in Huffman (1997: 
293-315) of the system of Degree of Control signaled by the French 
clitics lui and le/la/les versus prepositional phrases with à. 
xi For instance, there are streets in Venice that are too narrow at some 
points for pedestrians to carry open umbrellas, while that is not a 
factor in Manhattan, where streets are at least forty feet wide, or in 
Northampton County, where roads run extensively between peanut 
fields. 
xii See pp. 48-55 of their volume for a full statement of their criteria. 
xiii Otheguy & Zentella (2012: 9) actually apply this statement only to 
formal linguistics, but, as seen above, it in fact applies more broadly. 
xiv This is not at all to dispute or dismiss their own carefully thought-
out reasons for speaking of “absence” rather than “null subject” but 
rather to give my own twist to the question, in the service of the point 
being made in this paper. 
